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1 Oscar O. Schachter, The Decline of the Nation-State and its Implications forInternational Law, 36 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 7, 23 (1997):Global enterprise and communication networks will continue to produce rules andprocedures for transnational activities, many of which, like the lex mercatoria, will haveonly a limited link to national and international law. We can expect a greater mix andoverlap of public and private international law with the line between them rather blurred.Movements toward democracy—liberal or populist—manifested through civil societywill also influence international responses and add to human rights law and to principlesof collective recognition. There will probably be new international “persons” and newconceptions of property and equity entering into international law. State may be decliningin power, but the horizons of international law continue to expand.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1997, Professor Oscar Schachter of Columbia University Law School predicted acontinuing decline of the nation-state and a continuing emergence of new structures and norms toregulate transnational activities.1 His prediction captured many demonstrable features of our evolving
* Professor of Law, George Washington University. The author extends his thanks to ProfessorsSteve Charnovitz and Steve Schooner for very helpful comments, and to José E. Arvelo-Vélez forsuperb research assistance. 
22 There are variants to this term, such as transnational corporation (TNC) or multinationalenterprise (MNE)
3 For a brief discussion of what constitutes an “MNC,” see PETER MUCHLINSKI,MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND THE LAW 12-15 (1995).
4 INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, INCOTERMS 2000: ICC OFFICIAL RULES FORTHE INTERPRETATION OF TRADE TERMS (1998); see Jan Ramberg, ICC Guide to Incoterms 2000:Understanding and Practical Use (1999).
5 International Chamber of Commerce, Uniform Customs and Practices for DocumentaryCredits (UCP 500) (1993); see Charles del Busto, ICC Guide to Documentary Credit Operationsfor the UCP500 (1994).
 international society. States are declining in their role as the predominant structure for orderingtransnational relations, although in my view the phenomenon is one where states are continuing todo what they have always done—they are just not keeping up with the surge in transnationalcommercial, financial, service, health and informational relations.Rather than address broadly the issue of whether and how nations are in decline as the meansfor ordering transnational relations, this essay focuses on one feature of the emerging transnationalnormative regime: codes of conduct, often relating to labor, environmental or human rights issues,that seek to constrain socially undesirable behavior of transnational, non-state actors. Such codes ofconduct typically focus on the multinational corporation (MNC),2 by which is meant a corporationwith affiliated business operations in more than one country,3 with a particular eye to the activitiesof MNCs in the developing world, where governments are often unwilling or unable to regulateMNCs effectively. Codes of conduct of this type should be distinguished from private transnationalcodes that corporations find useful in efficiently selling goods and services across borders, such asthe International Chamber of Commerce’s Incoterms4 or UCP,5 or in protecting the security of such
36 See, e.g., International Chamber of Commerce, General Usage for International DigitallyEnsured Commerce (1977), at <http://www.iccwbo.org/home/guidec/guidec_one/guidec.asp>;William F. Fox Jr., The International Chamber of Commerce’s GUIDEC Principles: Private-Sector Rules for Digital Signatures, 35 INT’L LAW. 71 (2001).
7 Oscar Schachter principally spoke to this sort of transnational law in his discussion ofthe impact of global capitalism. Schachter, supra note 1, at 10-12 (“Such law tends to reflecteconomic power and private interests and to escape scrutiny in light of community values.”).While Schachter also addressed the impact of non-governmental organizations or civil societygroups on the development of international law, id. at 13-14, he did not directly address the issueof various corporate and civil society stakeholders developing codes of conduct that implementinternational law. This essay seeks to carry his discussion further by addressing that topic.
8 For a general discussion of private sector codes of conduct, see Virginia Haufler,Private Sector International Regimes, in NON-STATE ACTORS AND AUTHORITY IN THE GLOBALSYSTEM 212 (Richard A. Higgott et al. eds., 2000).
transactions, such as standards to enhance the security of digital or Internet transactions.6 The latterare codes of conduct developed by private actors (and that are sometimes incorporated legally intotheir relations through contractual clauses)7 and are certainly a critical component of transnationalprivate behavior, but they raise less concerns regarding adherence to the codes because MNCs areeffective in maintaining, refining, and self-policing such codes, it being in their direct economicinterest to do so.8The non-state actor codes of conduct at issue in this essay, by contrast, are ones thatcorporations do not perceive as facilitating business transactions, at least not directly. Rather, thesecodes of conduct seek to promote socially-responsible MNC conduct, largely in the developingworld, so as to prevent harm or mistreatment of persons or things caused by MNC operations (e.g.,the existence of unhealthy worker conditions in an MNC factory). Such harm or mistreatment neednot be a core concern for the corporate actor; indeed, the MNC—in theory fundamentally driven to
49 See Michael K. Addo, Human Rights and Transnational Corporations—AnIntroduction, in HUMAN RIGHTS STANDARDS AND THE RESPONSIBILITY OF TRANSNATIONALCORPORATIONS 15 (Michael K. Addo ed., 1999) [hereinafter HUMAN RIGHTS STANDARDS].
10 See, e.g., EMEKA A. DURUIGBO, MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND INTERNATIONALLAW: ACCOUNTABILITY AND COMPLIANCE ISSUES IN THE PETROLEUM INDUSTRY 106-117 (2003).
11 Sullivan Principles for U.S. Corporations Operating in South Africa, 24 I.L.M. 1494(1985) (hereinafter “Sullivan Principles”).
maximize its profits although in practice driven by various factors9—may benefit far more byinflicting the harm or mistreatment than by engaging in socially-responsible behavior. Only inreaction to outrage and discontent by other actors (governments, non-governmental organizations,or “civil society” groups) might the MNC see a value in developing a code of conduct that, ifadhered to, would reduce the harm or mistreatment the MNC inflicts on others.10 Due to a vacuum of governmental regulation of MNCs in the developing world, thesecodes—a form of private regulation—has emerged to deal with the adverse social effects of MNCactivity. For example, perhaps the best-known code of conduct for MNCs was developed withrespect to MNC activity in South Africa in the 1980’s, commonly referred to as the “SullivanPrinciples.”11 Created in 1977 by the Reverend Leon H. Sullivan, a Philadelphia pastor who was amember of General Motors Board of Trustees, the Sullivan Principles arose due to increasinglystrident public criticism of Western MNCs with operations in South Africa, where the governmentwas actively engaged in a system of apartheid, in which non-whites were systematically denied basiccivil and political rights, and denied fundamental employment, education, and housing opportunities.In response, leading MNCs pledged themselves to the Sullivan Principles, which consisted of sixprinciples (later amplified in 1978) for how MNCs operating in South Africa should conductthemselves with respect to apartheid. For example, one principle called for no racial segregation in
512 Id., principles 1, 5.
13 For an analysis for the Sullivan Principles and their success, see S. Prakash Sethi &Oliver F. Williams, Creating and Implementing Global Codes of Conduct: An Assessment of theSullivan Principles as a Role Model for Developing International Codes of Conduct—LessonsLearned and Unlearned, 105 BUS. & SOC’Y REV. 169 (2000); S. PRAKASH SETHI, SETTINGGLOBAL STANDARDS 95-109 (2003).
14 Global Sullivan Principles of Social Responsibility (1999), athttp://www.globalsullivanprinciples.org/principles.htm.
15 Id.
16 Companies and Organizations Endorsing the Global Sullivan Principles (Oct. 9, 2002),at http://www.globalsullivanprinciples.org/Endorser_list_Oct9.PDF.
eating, comfort, and work facilities, while another called for increasing the number of non-whitesin management and supervisory positions.12 MNCs were called upon to pledge themselvesvoluntarily to the Sullivan Principles and over the course of the fifteen years that they existed (untilSouth Africa abandoned apartheid) some 150 MNCs made such pledges.13 The initial SullivanPrinciples spawned a more general code in 1999, known as the Global Sullivan Principles of SocialResponsibility.14 That code also contains eight principles whereby MNCs pledge, among otherthings, to “[r]espect our employees’ voluntary freedom of association”; “[c]ompensate ouremployees to enable them to meet at least their basic needs”; and “[p]rovide a safe and healthyworkplace; protect human health and the environment; and promote sustainable development.”15Hundreds of MNCs (including ChevronTexaco, Coca-Cola, and General Motors) and other entities,such as local governments and educational institutions, have pledged themselves to theseprinciples.16 Such MNCs typically then assert that they have revised their internal policies so as to
617 See, e.g., Proctor & Gamble, 2003 Sustainability Report: Linking Opportunity withResponsibility 25 (2003) (“We have reviewed and revised our policies to make sure we arealigned with the Global Sullivan Principles.”), available athttp://www.pg.com/company/our_commitment/sustainability.jhtml;jsessionid=23JXSG4ALAX21QFIAJ1SZOWAVABHMLHC#.
18 Schachter, supra note 1, at 21-22.
19 See Robin Broad & John Cavanagh, The Corporate Accountability Movement: Lessonsand Opportunities, 23:2 FLETCHER FORUM WORLD AFF. 151, 167 (1999) (“With governmentsless willing or able to take on the problems of global corporations, [non-governmentalorganizations in the 1990s] have attempted to harness their own growing countervailing powerand have pressed for new forms of enforcement of new rules that do not depend ongovernments.”).
be in accordance with the principles.17The two broad tendencies observed by Oscar Schachter with respect to the decline of thenation-state may be discerned within the dynamic by which codes—such as the SullivanPrinciples—are formed.18 Multinational corporations inherently emphasize the free market as theprimary means of organizing transnational corporate behavior; for them, government control andinterference may be necessary in some respects, but should be kept at an absolute minimum.Consequently, to the extent that new principles based on “socially desirable behavior” are to beapplied to corporate conduct, MNCs are far more attracted to codes that are self-applied, that aretailored to the MNC’s unique situation, and that are not dictated by government regulation. Civilsociety groups, in an ideal world, might press for greater governmental regulation of MNCs, but theytoo are skeptical about the efficacy of government involvement, not because they distrustgovernment interference generally, but because they doubt they can achieve their goals throughgovernment power.19 Such groups note that governments in the developed world resist regulatingMNCs abroad, and if pressed to issue regulations, might set lower standards than may be achieved
720 Id. at 22.
in voluntary codes. Further, civil society groups are aware that governments in the developing worldoften lack the capacity or the will to regulate MNCs; indeed, authoritarian or non-democratic regimesmay be uninterested in addressing broad social concerns. Instead, civil society groups stress the needfor codes that foster greater participatory democracy within the corporate structure, whereby workersare able to unionize to seek better wages and working conditions, and whereby consumers andshareholders of the corporation are made aware of corporate conduct and are empowered to act ifsuch conduct deviates from acceptable behavior. Moreover, in crafting such codes, both MNCs andcivil society groups favor mechanisms for non-governmental monitoring of corporate behavior andcertification of good corporate behavior. Thus, neither side (Schachter labels the two tendencies asbeing the “right” and the “left) is particularly focused on the role of government and, indeed, bothsides “have had some influence in weakening the autonomy of states.”20This essay proceeds in Part II by briefly summarizing the rise of these codes of conduct, withparticular attention to certain highly visible examples, such as the United Nations Global Compact,the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Guidelines for MultinationalEnterprises, and the International Organisation for Standardisation (ISO) environmental managementsystem standards. Part III notes the many criticisms that have been levied against such codes andspeculates that, over the long term, such codes may not survive in their present form. Part IVsuggests a new approach to thinking about these codes, one that might enhance their legitimacy,effectiveness, and credibility. In essence, this essay urges that greater thought be given by allstakeholders to an increased role for governments in the development and implementation of suchcodes. While transforming the codes wholesale into binding law is not politically feasible at this
821 See, e.g., ROBERT GILPIN, THE CHALLENGE OF GLOBAL CAPITALISM 172-78 (2000).
22 The explosion of MNC activity in the 1990’s may be seen whether one looks at MNCsales, foreign employment, or foreign investment. For example, from 1990 to 2000, sales by theone hundred largest MNCs rose from $3.2 trillion to nearly $4.8 trillion and employment of
time, and may never be economically desirable, other means of governmental involvement shouldbe considered. For instance, governments can play a better role in bringing stakeholders together toform such codes and do better at identifying what types of codes are effective and which are not.Governments might do better at using national laws and regulations to make adherence to such codesmore attractive, such as by using the codes to help reduce regulatory uncertainty and as “safeharbors” for MNCs against criminal or civil penalties. At the same time, governments might usenational laws to regulate better MNC use of the codes, such as by compelling disclosure ofinformation about MNC adherence to the code. The role of governments would not be one of statecontrol of corporate activity but, rather, one of helping empower the individual autonomy ofcorporations within certain bounds of justice, fairness, and equity.
II. THE RISE OF NON-STATE ACTOR CODES
A. The Impetus for Such Codes.
The activities of MNCs provide significant benefits in creating wealth in states where theyoperate, through creation of jobs, production of goods and services, efficient use of technology, laborand capital, development of export markets, and concomitant growth in gross domestic product byexporting states.21 While much of the increased MNC activity of the 1990’s22 was among states of
9persons outside the MNC’s home country rose from 24 million to 54 million, while from 1996 to2000 the value of cross-border mergers and acquisitions rose from $94 billion to an astounding$866 billion. See UN CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT (UNCTAD), WORLDINVESTMENT REPORT: 2002: TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND EXPORT COMPETITIVENESSxv, 12, 90 (2002).
23 For example, the number of cross-border mergers and acquisitions in developingcountries increased during 1995-1999 by fifty percent. See WORLD BANK, GLOBALDEVELOPMENT FINANCE 2001: BUILDING COALITIONS FOR EFFECTIVE DEVELOPMENT FINANCE40-41 (2001).
24 See CYNTHIA DAY WALLACE, THE MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE AND LEGAL CONTROL36-37, 70-71 (2002).
25 Id. at 42-45.
the developed world, a portion included the movement of MNC operations to the developed worldto take advantage of a cheaper supply of labor and other resources.23 Indeed, though the story of the1970’s and 1980’s may have been one of developing countries seeking to nationalize or expropriateforeign investment as a means of stemming post-colonial economic “neo-colonization,”24 the storyof the 1990’s was one of developing states realizing the great benefits of attracting foreigninvestment and technology, so as to develop export economies of their own.25 At the same time, concerns have arisen from this increased MNC activity in the developingworld. One aspect of the investment in developing countries is a greater willingness of developingcountries to allow MNCs to own or manage projects in key public sectors, such as energy,telecommunications, transport, water, and sanitation. While there may be benefits from privatizingdecision-making in such sectors, it means that core societal needs and natural resources are largelycontrolled by entities that governments may not have the capacity to hold accountable for customer
10
26 See Theodore Panayotou, The Role of the Private Sector in Sustainable InfrastructureDevelopment, in BRIDGES TO SUSTAINABILITY: BUSINESS AND GOVERNMENT WORKINGTOGETHER FOR A BETTER ENVIRONMENT 46, 60 (Luis Gomez-Echeverri ed., 1997), available athttp://www.yale.edu/environment/publications/bulletin/101pdfs/101panayotou.pdf.
27 See SETHI, supra note 13, at 5-7.
28 ELLIOT J. SCHRAGE, REPORT OF THE UNIVERSITY OF IOWA CENTER FOR HUMAN RIGHTSTO THE U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, PROMOTING INTERNATIONAL WORKER RIGHTS THROUGH PRIVATEVOLUNTARY INITIATIVES: PUBLIC RELATIONS OR PUBLIC POLICY? 5-6 (Jan. 2004) [hereinafterSCHRAGE], available at http://www.cfr.org/pdf/Schrage-DOS.pdf.
29 For example, a recent report prepared by the staffs of the UN Development Programme,the UN Environment Programme, the World Bank, and the World Resources Institute found that,in regulating MNCs, governmentalcommand and control regulation has many limitations. Its success rests on vigorous andtimely enforcement. This is difficult in countries where state authority is weak, budgetsare constrained, or technical capacity is low. The rigidity of these regulations is also a
service and compliance with local laws.26 Some observers assert that the distribution of wealthgenerated by MNCs when they operate in developing countries has been largely skewed in favor ofthe MNCs (and their shareholders) and against laborers.27 Moreover, the working conditions forlaborers for MNCs in developing countries are often very poor: laborers have difficulty unionizing;factory conditions generally are unhealthful; child labor is common.28 Environmental standards indeveloping states tend to be low or unenforced, often allowing relatively unchecked emissions of airpollutants and toxic materials.One response to such concerns is to argue that MNCs are simply taking advantage offavorable business climates found in other countries; if those countries wish to impose higherminimum wage rates or better working conditions, they are free to do so. Some developing stateshave established labor and environmental laws to protect local resources, but they often lack theresources to enforce them, and MNCs take advantage of such lack of enforcement.29 Further, host
11
problem. Many companies and policy-makers contend that standard governmentregulation doesn’t leave them the flexibility to fix environmental problems in the mostefficient ways and doesn’t encourage improvements beyond those specified by law.UN DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME ET AL., WORLD RESOURCES: 2002-2004: DECISIONS FOR THEEARTH: BALANCE, VOICE, AND POWER 108 (2003).
30 See, e.g., id. (“Nor do traditional regulations address the governance challenges posedby the increasing globalization of corporate activity. In the face of competition to attractbusiness, some nations are less willing or able to regulate transnational corporations effectively.In this case, transnationals largely regulate themselves, with little accountability to communitiesor consumers for their impacts . . . .”) John Parkinson, The Socially Responsible Company, inHUMAN RIGHTS STANDARDS, supra note 9, at 57 (“the proposition that [MNCs] need do no morethan obey local laws will in many cases be morally unappealing. In the absence of mandatoryinternational standards, again the need for self-regulation is indicated.”).
31 See Addo, supra note 9, at 24.
32 SETHI, supra note 13, at 154.
countries sensitive to the adverse social affects of MNC activity may be in a weak position if creatingbetter laws or enforcing existing laws results in movement of MNCs to other countries.30 Finally, theresponse assumes that the host government is sensitive to the interests of its nationals; while suchan assumption may be valid in democratic states, in more authoritarian or non-democratic states theinterests of the government may not coincide with those of its people.31 Ironically, while MNCs haveemerged and thrived from the establishment of strong developed-state economies that are based ondemocracy, the rule of law, and independent judiciaries, some MNCs are taking advantage of theabsence of such conditions in developing countries. By way of example, Nike Inc.—with $9.5 billionin revenues, it is the largest global marketer of athletic footwear, apparel and equipment—outsources97 percent of its footwear products to factories in four countries: China, Indonesia, Thailand, andVietnam. Those countries are all characterized by highly repressive and corrupt governmentalregimes that provide little if any enforcement of their own labor and environmental laws.32
12
33 See Robert J. Liubicic, Corporate Codes of Conduct and Product Labeling Schemes:The Limits and Possibilities of Promoting International Labor Rights Standards Through PrivateInitiatives, 30 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 111 (1998).
In short, MNCs operating in developing countries have done what one would expect themto do in a free market; seek out the least expensive means of conducting operations so as tomaximize profits. The problem is that, in doing so, they have been viewed as inflicting unacceptableharm and mistreatment. As human rights, labor rights, and environmental rights continue to advancewithin the global consciousness, the practices of many MNCs in developing countries have beenregarded as out of step with social expectations. This gap, in turn, has led to strident criticism ofMNC activity, and sometimes to consumer backlash whereby MNCs are faced with demands forproducts certified as having been produced without adverse social consequences.33MNCs themselves recognize this divergence of MNC operations from social expectations,and consequently many have embraced the movement toward voluntary codes of conduct thatinculcate key norms in the fields of labor, human rights, consumer protection, anticorruption, andthe environment. To date, these codes have taken many shapes and sizes, but they generally can becharacterized as follows. The codes are voluntary in nature; MNCs are not forced to adopt the codesbut, rather, pledge themselves to the code because they see it as in their interests to do so. The codestypically consist of a series of principles, standards or guidelines, which may be broad andaspirational in nature or may be more detailed and operational in nature. In developing the normscontained in the codes, the codes may draw on or refer to international law norms (particularly in thefield of international labor or environmental law, or human rights law), may focus on MNCadherence to local laws, and/or may call for adherence to norms articulated solely in the code itself.A code might be developed ad hoc for a specific company (sometimes referred to as an “operational”
13
34 For detailed studies of codes of conduct adopted within certain broad industry sectors,with particular attention to comparison of “external” codes with the “internal” codes that theyspawn, see WORLD BANK GROUP CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY PRACTICE, COMPANYCODES OF CONDUCT AND INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS: ANALYTICAL COMPARISON: PART I OF II(Oct. 2003), available athttp://www.worldbank.org/html/fpd/privatesector/csr/doc/Company%20Codes%20of%20Conduct.pdf; OECD, Codes of Corporate Conduct: Expanded Review of Their Contents (May 2001),available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/57/24/1922656.pdf; Andrew Wilson & ChrisGribben, Business Responses to Human Rights (Apr. 2000), available athttp://www.acbas.org/Web/AshAcbas.nsf/pdfs/Response/$file/Response.PDF; MichaelUrminsky, ed., Self-Regulation in the Workplace: Codes of Conduct; Social Labeling andSocially Responsible Investment 9-34 (undated working paper), available athttp://www.ilo.org/public/english/employment/multi/download/wp1mcc.pdf.; Janelle Diller, ASocial Conscience in the Global Marketplace? Labour Dimensions of Codes of Conduct, SocialLabelling and Investor Initiatives, 138 INT’L LABOUR REV. 99, 112-17 (1999).
or “internal” code). Alternatively, a code might be developed for a class of companies in a particularfield (e.g., the apparel or extractive industries) or for companies generally (sometimes referred to as“model” or “external” codes) which can then, in turn, lead to the creation of associated operationalcodes.34 The codes might be drafted solely by private sector entities, usually bringing together arange of stakeholders, such as labor groups, environmental groups, religious groups, and corporategroups. Alternatively, the codes might be drafted under the auspices of governments or bygovernment representatives working through international organizations, although even then relevantstakeholders are typically a part of the drafting process.Once a code is established, typically an MNC is expected to pledge itself publicly to the codeand develop internal corporate rules or policies based on the code. MNC managers are then trainedto comply with those rules or policies in corporate decision-making and operations. While the codesnormally call upon the MNC to make public its decision to adhere to the code, further transparencyregarding corporate adherence to the code may not be required. Different techniques of monitoring,
14
35 See OECD, Making Codes of Corporate Conduct Work: Management Control Systemsand Corporate Responsibility (Feb. 2001), available athttp://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/45/29/1922806.pdf.
36 See, e.g., infra note 80 and accompanying text.
37 See Diller, supra note 34, at 103.
verification, audits, or certification might be an element of a particular code,35 but in any event thecodes often do not require such steps by an entity external to the MNC. Since the codes arevoluntary, MNCs are not exposed to any criminal or civil penalties in the event that they fail to abideby the codes (they remain, of course, exposed to penalties if the MNC violates relevant nationallaws). Thus, the codes are not enforced by governments.A difficult problem with the codes concerns corporate structures. In many instances, an MNCmay engage in business with a foreign government or a foreign company over whom the MNC doesnot exercise any corporate control. In such instances, the MNC may have adopted a particular codefor itself, but have no power to impose the code on its partners. (Indeed, less-than-scrupulous MNCsmay structure their business relations so as to take advantage of the lack of corporate control overpartners.) Some codes seek to address this problem by calling upon MNCs only to engage incommercial relations with partners, suppliers, or distributors that either adhere to a code or whoseconduct is compatible with the code.36 For example, “sourcing guidelines” of a buyer might specifythe workplace requirements of other enterprises in the supply chain.37 Yet even MNCs that areinterested in promoting a code with their partners may find it difficult to do so. Success may turn onfactors outside the control of the MNC, such as the geographic concentration of production markets;the narrowness of the supply base; the degree of vertical integration within an industry and of overlap
15
38 SCHRAGE, supra note 28, at 173-75.
39 See, e.g., Simon Williams, How Principles Benefit the Bottom Line: The Experience ofthe Co-operative Bank, in HUMAN RIGHTS STANDARDS, supra note 9, at 63.
with other industries; and the overall concentration of the global market.38Since the codes are voluntary in nature, the codes are not written to impose constraints thatMNCs would find onerous; instead, the codes are crafted to promote conduct that entails some coststo the MNC, but costs that are outweighed by the benefits to the MNCs. The costs to MNCs includethe basic expenses involved both in altering internal corporate rules and policies, training personnelregarding the new policies, and pursuing any internal or external associated monitoring, verification,audits, or certification, and in internalizing costs that had previously been externalized (e.g., payinghigher wages, avoiding environmental harms, etc.). The benefits to MNCs can potentially takevarious forms. Arguably there will be some internal cost savings achieved, such as from moreefficient use of resources (e.g., achieved when pursuing waste reduction), or from having a heathierand thus more productive work force. Cost savings may also arise if adherence to such a code allowsthe MNC to save on insurance premiums or have access to capital at lower rates, if insurers orlenders are concerned about possible adverse consequences of MNC activities. To the extent that thecode is adopted by an MNC’s competitors, then the code may assist in creating a level playing fieldfor the MNC so that its good corporate conduct does not put it at a competitive disadvantage. Finally,by adhering to such a code, the MNC may enjoy an enhanced public image, thus avoidingshareholder dissatisfaction with management, consumer boycotts of MNC goods or services, laborunrest, and undesirable regulation by either its host or home governments.39Over the past thirty years, with the rise of MNC activities in the developing world, these
16
40 For a compendium containing short descriptions of several codes, see U.S. COUNCILFOR INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY COMMITTEE, UCSIB COMPENDIUMOF CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY INITIATIVES (2002). For an internet site with links to informationrelating to various codes, see http://www.business-humanrights.org/Categories/Principles.
41 See E.S.C. Res. 1721 (LIII) (July 28, 1972).
42 See U.N. Dep’t of Econ. & Soc. Aff., The Impact of Multinational Corporations onDevelopment and on International Relations, UN Doc. E/5500/Rev.1, ST/ESA/6, UN Sales No.E.74.II.A.5, at 6-12 (1974).
43 See E.S.C. Res. 1908 (LVII) (Aug. 2, 1974); E.S.C. Res. 1913 (LVII) (Dec. 5, 1974).
codes have proliferated.40 The next section provides a brief tour de table of some of the moreinteresting transnational codes of conduct that have emerged, along with some of the criticisms ofthose codes.
B. Selected Codes of Conduct.
UN Draft Code of Conduct for Transnational Corporations. Any discussion of theemergence of corporate codes of conduct should probably begin with either the Sullivan Principles(discuss above) or the failed effort by the United Nations from the late 1970’s to the early 1990’s todevelop a broad code of conduct for MNCs. In 1972, the U.N. Economic and Social Council(ECOSOC) requested the Secretary-General to appoint a group of eminent persons to study theimpact of multinational corporations on the world economy and to submit recommendations forappropriate international action.41 The group recommended that ECOSOC establish an institutionto study MNCs.42 To that end, in 1974 ECOSOC adopted resolutions to establish both a UN inter-governmental commission and a UN center on transnational corporations.43 Those entities embarked
17
44 See, e.g., Draft UN Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations, May 1983, 23I.L.M. 626 (1984); Draft UN Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations, UN Doc.E/1988/39/Add.1 (Feb. 1, 1988).
45 E.S.C. Doc. E/1990/94, annex (June 12, 1990).
on the creation of a code of conduct on transnational corporations. Over the course of fifteen years,various drafts of the code were formulated,44 with the most recent in 1990.The 1990 draft code was divided into four parts on the activities of MNCs, the treatment ofMNCs, intergovernmental cooperation, and implementation of the code.45 With respect to theactivities of MNCs, the draft code set forth (1) various general rules (e.g., respect for local laws andcultural traditions, respect for human rights, and avoiding corruption); (2) certain economic, financialand social rules (e.g., acceptance of the ILO Tripartite Declaration discussed below and adherenceto national laws on consumer protection and the environment); and (3) rules on disclosure ofinformation. In the section on treatment of MNCs, the code contained certain rights of host statesbut also protections to be accorded to MNCs, such as the right to fair and equitable treatment. Thecode urged intergovernmental cooperation at all levels in the form of exchanges of information andconsultations. Finally, the code called upon states to disseminate the code, follow it within theirterritories, and report to the United Nations on their implementation. The UN Commission ontransnational corporations, in turn, would receive such reports and periodically assess suchimplementation.The 1990 draft, however, was never finalized and never adopted by the UN GeneralAssembly due to serious disagreements among states that reflected in large part the resistance at thattime  of developing states to “economic neo-colonization.” The draft code’s focus on not just theconduct of MNCs but also the rights of host states led to sharp disagreement over the legal standard
18
46 CYNTHIA DAY WALLACE, THE MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE AND LEGAL CONTROL1082 (2002).
47 Paul Lansing & Alex Rosaria, An Analysis of the United Nations Proposed Code ofConduct of Transnational Corporations, 14 WORLD COMPETITION 35, 40 (1991).
48 Id. at 41-42; Barbara A. Frey, Legal and Ethical Responses of TransnationalCorporations in the Protection of Human Rights, 6 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 153, 167 (1997).
49 Lansing & Rosaria, supra note 47, at 45.
50 WALLACE, supra note 46, at 1083-84.
51 The commission was integrated into the structure of the UN Conference on Trade andDevelopment and renamed the Commission on International Investment and Transnational
for expropriation of MNC property by a host state, as well as on issues such as the definition of“MNC”(e.g., whether state-owned enterprises should be excluded), the jurisdiction of states, and thelegal status of the code.46 With respect to MNC conduct, strongly-polarized positions developed inwhich developing states pressed for detailed and mandatory rules on MNC conduct, whereasdeveloped states preferred more general language to which MNCs would voluntarily adhere.47Developing states emphasized reliance on host country national laws and regulations and resistedhaving the code impose constraints on host governments. By contrast, developed states regardeddeveloping country national laws as often too complex or inadequate, and advocated having the coderefer to international law as the relevant body of law.48 Yet views within the developing world werenot monolithic, due largely to their differing levels of development.49 In the end, the draft code provided a template of sorts for codes that followed,50 but did notitself achieve a UN imprimatur and has not been adopted by MNCs. By 1994, the United Nationshad significantly downgraded the UN inter-governmental commission and had terminated the UNcenter on transnational corporations.51
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Corporations. See E.S. C. Res. 1994/1 (July 14, 1994).
52 See, e.g., Kathryn Sikkink, Codes of Conduct for TNCs: The Case of WHO/UNICEFCode, 40 INT’L ORG. 815 (1986). The WHO/UNICEF International Code of Marketing ofBreastmilk Substitutes, which was adopted by the World Health Assembly in 1981, see WHARes. 34/22 (1981), bans all promotion of bottle feeding and sets out requirements for labelingand information on infant feeding.
53 See ILO International Labour Conference, Declaration on Fundamental Principles andRights at Work (June 1998) [hereinafter ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles], availableathttp://www.ilo.org/dyn/declaris/DECLARATIONWEB.static_jump?var_language=EN&var_pagename=DECLARATIONTEXT. For criticism of this trend, see Philip Alston, “Core LabourStandards” and the Transformation of the International Labour Rights Regime, 15 EUR. J. INT’LL. 457 (2004).
54 International Labour Organization, Tripartite Declaration of Principles ConcerningMultinational Enterprises and Social Policy (1977), 17 I.L.M. 422 (1978), available athttp://www.ilo.org/public/english/employment/multi/tridecl/index.htm.
1977 ILO Tripartite Declaration of Principles. With a broad code of conduct for MNCs wasnot possible within the U.N. system, other codes that avoided addressing the rights of host states andthat pursued standards in specific fields, such as international labor law, international human rightslaw, and international health law,52 met with more success. With respect to international labor law,most standard-setting undertaken by the International Labour Organisation (ILO) has occurred in thecontext of developing binding treaties, although through a1998 non-binding declaration the ILOarguably is moving in a direction of emphasizing certain core “principles” (freedom of association,freedom from forced labor and from child labor, and non-discrimination in employment) as opposedto labor “rights.”53 In 1977, however, the ILO Governing Body adopted a tripartite (government,employer, worker) Declaration of Principles to guide MNEs and other stakeholders in thedevelopment of policies directed toward social progress.54 The declaration calls for MNCs to pursue policies that promote equal opportunity, security,
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56 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III) (Dec. 10, 1948).
57 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171(ICCPR).
58 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 993U.N.T.S. 3.
59 Constitution of the International Labor Organization, Oct. 9, 1946, 15 U.N.T.S. 35, 62Stat. 3485.
60 ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles, supra note 53.
61 Virginia A. Leary, Nonbinding Accords in the Field of Labor, in INTERNATIONALCOMPLIANCE WITH NONBINDING ACCORDS 247, 250 (Edith Brown Weiss, ed. 1997).
62 See id., at 252-53.
and collective bargaining in employment, and that preclude arbitrary dismissal, strike-breaking, andother unfair practices. In doing so, the declaration calls for MNCs and others not only to obey locallaws and practices,55 but also to respect the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,56 theInternational Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,57 the International Covenant on Economic,Social and Cultural Rights,58 and the ILO’s Constitution59 and 1998 declaration on fundamentalprinciples and rights at work.60 The Tripartite Declaration, however, is not legally binding, nor is itsubject to the reporting and monitoring systems for ILO conventions and recommendations adoptedby the ILO conference of the parties.61 While there is a procedure requiring governments to reply toqueries regarding implementation of the Declaration, and the possibility of dispute settlement beforethe ILO Governing Body, the efficacy of such procedures appears doubtful.62 As for the Declaration’s overall effectiveness, some observers see the Declaration as “stilla ‘good’instrument, kept relevant by periodic surveys of the effect given to the Declaration by
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64 Leary, supra note 61, at 254.
65 The sub-commission is a subsidiary organ of the UN Commission on Human Rights,whose twenty-six members are nominated by states and elected by the Commission, but whoserve in their personal capacities. 
66 Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, Norms on theResponsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard toHuman Rights, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2 (2003), available atwww.unhchr.ch/html/menu2/2/55sub/55sub.htm.
67 Id., pt. A.
governments and by employers’ and worker’s organizations . . . .”63 Others are less impressed, andnot that the Declaration may suffer from a lack of institutional support. Professor Leary concludes:
The Declaration could be an important instrument if it were publicized and promoted by theILO and made better known to groups such as human rights and aid groups concerned withissues relating to multinational enterprises. Trade unions have been the only constituencyreferring to the Declaration and their efforts do not seem to have been particularly effective.64
2003 UN Sub-Commission on Human Rights Code on TNCs. In the field of human rights, theUN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights65 recently adopted a codeon the responsibilities of transnational corporations.66 The code recognizes that states have theprimary responsibility for the promotion and protection of human rights, but also asserts that MNCshave such obligations as well.67 The code then sets forth six types of rights or obligations that MNCsmust observe: (1) right to equal opportunity and non-discriminatory treatment; (2) right to security
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of persons; (3) rights of workers, such as against forced labor or child labor, remuneration thatensures an adequate standard of living, and right to collective bargaining; (4) respect for nationalsovereignty (e.g., refraining from bribery) and human rights (e.g., right to food and drinking water);(5) obligations with regard to consumer protection; and (6) obligations with regard to environmentalprotection, such as complying with relevant national and international laws.68One interesting component of this code is that it contains several provisions relating toimplementation. The code states that MNCs “shall” adopt “internal rules of operation in compliance”with the code and shall periodically report on implementation, and shall incorporate the code intotheir contracts with suppliers, distributors, licensees, and others.69 Further, the code states that TNCsshall be subject to transparent and independent monitoring and verification by the United Nationsand “other international and national mechanisms already in existence or yet to be created”.70 Thecode provides that states “should” establish the legal framework necessary for implementing thecode.71 Moreover, MNCs “shall provide prompt effective and adequate reparation to those persons”adversely affected by failure to comply with the norms.72Supporters of the code have heralded the code as a “landmark step” and even as the “first
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73 David Weissbrodt & Muria Kruger, Norms on the Responsibilities of TransnationalCorporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights, 97 AJIL 901, 903(2004).
74 Human Rights Commission Res. 2004/116 (Apr. 20, 2004).
75 International Chamber of Commerce & International Organisation of Employers, JointViews of the IOE and ICC on the Draft “Norms on the Responsibilities of TransnationalCorporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights” (undated), atwww.iccwbo.org. 
76 See Resolution on EU standards for European Enterprises operating in developingcountries: towards a European Code of Conduct, Europ. Parl. Res. A4-0508/98 (1998).
77 For a discussion of the Model Business Principles developed by the U.S. governmentduring the Clinton Administration, see Frey, supra note 48, at 172-73.
nonvoluntary initiative accepted at the international level.”73 Initial enthusiasm for the code,however, has been muted. The Commission on Human Rights (which, unlike the Sub-Commission,consists of representatives of governments) took note of the code, but in its recommendation to theUN Economic and Social Council affirmed that the code “has not been requested by the Commissionand, as a draft proposal, has no legal standing, and that the Sub-Commission should not perform anymonitoring function in this regard.”74 Major international business organizations have criticized thecode as an inappropriate effort to “privative” vague human rights standards, in a manner that willinvite “highly subjective, politicized claims.”75OECD Guidelines for MNEs. MNC codes of conduct need not be developed through theUnited Nations or its specialized agencies: smaller groupings of states, such as the twenty-fivemember European Union,76 or even individual states,77 have also pursued such codes. Codes draftedby smaller groups of states may allow for greater specificity than more global codes, since they areusually negotiated among governments with similar attitudes (e.g., among a group of developed
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78 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Guidelines forMultinational Enterprises, 15 I.L.M. 969 (1976); see Daniel J. Plaine, The OECD Guidelines forMultinational Enterprises, 11 INT’L LAW. 339 (1977). The OECD periodically reviews andoccasionally revises the guidelines. For the current guidelines, see OECD, The OECD Guidelinesfor Multinational Enterprises: Revision 2000, pt. 1, § II, para. 2 (2000) [hereinafter OECDGuidelines], available at http://www.oecd.org/daf/investment/guidelines/index.htm; see alsoOECD, The OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (4th ed. 2000) (OECD publicationexplaining the nature, scope, and operation of the guidelines).
79 OECD Guidelines, supra note 78, pt. 1, § IV.
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states). While they are more limited in geographic scope, they can be highly relevant if the principalconcern is the conduct of MNCs based in such a bloc of states. For example, in June 1976, the Council of Ministers if the thirty-three member Organizationof Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) adopted a declaration on internationalinvestment and multinational enterprises, to which was annexed a set of guidelines for multinationalenterprises.78 The guidelines basically establish recommended standards for good conduct for allMNEs operating in or from OECD countries, including practices relating to taxation, financing, andinformation disclosure. Further, the guidelines contain an “employment and industrial relations”section prohibiting discrimination in the employment or promotion of personnel, establishing ageneral standard that MNEs should “respect the right of their employees to be represented by tradeunions,” and containing other protections for laborers.79 The guidelines also include a section on“environmental protection” stating that MNEs should “take due account of the need to protect theenvironment and avoid creating environmentally related health problems” and setting forth variousmeans for doing so.80 The most recent revision of the guidelines, adopted in 2000, augments theseprotections by including a new general policy stating that MNEs should “[r]espect the human rights
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of those affected by their activities consistent with the host government’s international obligationsand commitments.”81 Further, the 2000 guidelines address the vexing problem of corporate structureby calling upon MNCs to “[e]ncourage, where practicable, business partners, including suppliers andsubcontractors, to apply principles of corporate conduct compatible with the Guidelines.”82 Newrecommendations are added on the elimination of child labor and forced labor83 and on improvinginternal environmental management and contingency planning for environmental impacts.84 Thesections on disclosure and transparency are updated to encourage social and environmentalaccountability.85 Finally, the 2000 guidelines add new sections on combating corruption andconsumer protection.86 As noted above, the guidelines do reference international law by calling for respect for humanrights “consistent with the host government’s international obligations and commitments.”87 Theguidelines, however, are not legally mandatory either on OECD governments or on OECD-basedcompanies. Rather, the declaration containing the guidelines represents a political commitment onthe part of OECD governments to foster such corporate conduct, and they reflect the values andaspirations of OECD members. Both corporate and labor groups were involved in the drafting of the
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88 Joachim Karl, The OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, in HUMAN RIGHTSSTANDARDS, supra note 9, 89 at 90. Corporate groups provide the views through the OECDBusiness and Industry Advisory Committee (BIAC), while labor groups provide their viewsthrough the OECD Trade Union Advisory Committee (TUAC).
89 For example, the national contact point for the United States is the director or the U.S.Department of State’s Office of Investment Affairs. The list of national contact points isavailable at http://www.oecd.org.
90 See JOHN M. KLINE, INTERNATIONAL CODES AND MULTINATIONAL BUSINESS 76-83(1985).
91 ANNUAL REPORT ON THE OECD GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES:ENHANCING THE ROLE OF BUSINESS IN THE FIGHT AGAINST CORRUPTION 25 (Dec. 2003).
guidelines and thus they have enjoyed the general support of both communities.88 Each OECDmember has a “national contact point” (usually part of a government agency) charged withpromoting the guidelines within the member state and gathering information on adherence to them.89Disputes concerning the guidelines can and have been referred to the OECD’s Committee onInvestment and Multinational Enterprises (CIME), a political body with no means of enforcing itsdecisions. The guidelines have met with mixed success. On the one hand, the guidelines have been usedby labor groups to pressure MNCs, sometimes through use of the OECD or cooperative nationalgovernments (although in many instances the pressure concerns MNC activities in the developedworld).90 According to the most recent OECD report on the guidelines, the guidelines “now rankamong the world’s foremost corporate responsibility instruments,” are “cited by heads of state andin the world business press,” and are referenced at 25,000 Internet pages.91 For some observers, theguidelines “have represented the most successful multilateral instrument to date” addressing the
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95 Secretary-General Kofi Annan, Address at the World Economic Forum in Davos,Switzerland (Jan. 31, 1999), U.N. Doc SG/SM/6448 (1999).
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conduct of MNCs in the field of foreign investment.92 On the other hand, the OECD report itselfnoted sixty-four instances of alleged non-observance of the guidelines by MNCs that had been filedwith national contact points, principally on matters concerning employment and industrial relations.93While it may still be too early to tell whether the 2000 revision will improve matters, some observersof the initial guidelines found that “the OECD Member countries had no intention of sacrificing theirown control to follow the moral force behind those guidelines.”94
1999 UN Global Compact. In 1999, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan announced hisintention to create a UN-sponsored forum between the United Nations and the transnational businesscommunity—known as the “Global Compact”—intended to promote good corporate practices in thearea of human rights, labor, and the environment.95 The principles set forth in the Global Compactare similar to the Sullivan Principles,  and draw upon the Universal Declaration on Human Rights,the ILO 1998 fundamental principles on rights at work, and the Rio Declaration on Environment andDevelopment.96 The Global Compact is far less detailed than the  ILO tripartite declaration, the UNSub-Commission on Human Rights code, or the OECD guidelines discussed above, but the principal
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97 The principles and other information about the Global Compact may be found at<http://www.unglobalcompact.org>. While there were initially only nine principles, at the GlobalCompact Leaders Summit in New York in June 2004 the tenth principle on working againstcorruption was added. 
objective of the Global Compact should be seen as taking those codes to another level, by invitingMNCs to join in the efforts of governments, international organizations, and non-governmentalorganizations in projects that advance social and economic development.The Global Compact principles state that businesses should: (1) “support and respect theprotection of internationally proclaimed human rights within their sphere of influence”; (2) “[m]akesure they are not complicit in human right abuses”; (3) “uphold the freedom of association and theeffective recognition of the right to collective bargaining”; (4) eliminate “all forms of forced andcompulsory labor”; (5) abolish child labor; (6) eliminate “discrimination in respect of employmentand occupation”; (7) “support a precautionary approach to environmental challenges”; (8)“[u]ndertake initiatives to promote greater environmental responsibility”; (9) “[e]ncourage thedevelopment and diffusion of environmentally friendly technologies”; and (10) “work against allforms of corruption, including extortion and bribery”.97 The Secretary-General called upon leading companies to embrace these principles as part oftheir corporate practices and to join in the efforts of governments, international organizations, andnon-governmental organizations in advancing social and economic development. To participate, acompany’s chief executive officer must send a letter (and endorsed by the company’s board ofdirectors) to the Secretary-General expressing support for the Global Compact. The company is thenexpected to change its business operations so that the Global Compact principles become part of itsculture, day-to-day operations, and public communications. Moreover, the company is expected to
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98 See UN Global Compact Office, How the Global Compact Works: Mission, Actors AndEngagement Mechanisms (2003). The concept of promoting partnerships among stakeholderswas also a key element of the World Summit on Sustainable Development that took place inJohannesburg, South Africa in August/September 2002.
99 UN Global Compact, Frequently Asked Questions (undated), athttp://www.unglobalcompact.org/Portal/Default.asp.
100 See, e.g., Text of a Letter Addressed to Kofi Anan, Secretary-General of the UnitedNations by a Group of Eminent Scholars and NGO Representatives from Around the World (July20, 2000), reprinted in SETHI, supra note 13, at 126.
publish in its annual report a description of the ways in which it is supporting the Global Compact,such as by undertaking partnership projects with UN agencies or civil-society organizations.98 Theprogress of participating companies will be posted on a U.N. Internet site along with comments bycivil society groups. By 2000, various companies—including BP, Daimler Chrysler, Dupont, Nike,Novartis, Rio Tinto, and Shell—had announced their acceptance of the Global Compact, and as of2004 several hundred had joined. The Global Compact is a voluntary initiative: there is no legal obligation placed upon thecompanies and no enforcement of such obligations, although companies must make submissions tothe United Nations that are then shared publicly. Instead of imposing legally binding obligations, theGlobal Compact is, according to the United Nations, “designed to stimulate change and to promotegood corporate citizenship and encourage innovative solutions and partnerships.”99 Critics, however, including many developing states, note that the lack of monitoring let aloneenforcement provides little confidence that by joining the Global Compact, corporations will complywith its principles.100 Indeed, critics believe that through the Global Compact major corporations maysimply “bluewash” their misconduct; that is, corporations would join the initiative and achieve apublic relations gain through association with the United Nations, but in the end would not
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102 SETHI, supra note 13, at 120.
103 Amnesty International, Human Rights Principles for Companies (Jan. 1, 1998),available at http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/ENGACT700011998.
104 Workers Rights Consortium, Model Code of Conduct (     ), available athttp://www.workersrights.org/wrc_coc.pdf. The consortium is a non-profit organization createdby college and university administrations, students and labor rights experts to assist in theenforcement of the code. The code seeks to protect workers in factories producing clothing andother goods bearing college and university names.
105 See, e.g., Reebok Int’l Ltd., Our Commitment to Human Rights (2003) (setting forththe footwear company’s human rights, health and safety, labor, and wage standards, as well asthe company’s means for implementing and monitoring them), available athttp://www.reebok.com/Static/global/initiatives/rights/pdf/ReebokHR_OurCommitment.pdf; see
significantly change their conduct.101 Other corporations who join the Global Compact may alreadybe conducting themselves properly; there may even be adverse selection whereby corporations withthe least need to change are the ones who join. One observer characterizes the criticisms as findingthat “the Global Compact at best will be a gold old boys club and at worst a support group in whichlike-minded corporations will share their experiences and encourage each other to do better nexttime.”102 Codes Developed within the Private Sector. The codes discussed above were developedprincipally by states acting through international organizations. There are also numerous codes ofconduct that have been established solely or principally in the private sector. In many instances, suchcodes are the product of a single civil society group— such as Amnesty International’s HumanRights Principles for Companies103 or the Workers Rights Consortium’s Model Code ofConduct104—or of a particular company to regulate its own activities.105
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also Frey, supra note 48, at 177-80 (discussing internal codes adopted by companies such asWal-Mart); Lance Compa & Tashia Hinchliffe-Darricarrère, Enforcing International LaborRights through Corporate Codes of Conduct, 33 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 663, 674-83 (same) .
106 The ISO is comprised mostly of independent standardization entities representing theirrespective countries of origin. For example, the United States is represented by the non-governmental American National Standards Institute (“ANSI”) which is based in New York,although various federal and state government agencies are ANSI members. Seehttp://www.ansi.org. Several countries are represented at the ISO by governmental organizations.For example, Canada’s Standard’s Council is a Crown corporation responsible to Parliament. Seehttp://www.scc.ca. Mexico’s Dirección Nacional de Normas is attached to the ministry for theeconomy. See http://www.economia.gob.mx. Morocco’s Service de Normalisation Industrielle isattached to the ministry of commerce and industry. Non-state actors are nevertheless dominant inthe ISO standard-setting process.
107 See DAVID HOYLE, ISO 9000 QUALITY SYSTEMS HANDBOOK (3d ed. 1998) 
 One well-known code developed within the private sector for addressing adverse socialimpacts is the environmental management system (EMS) standards of the International Organisationfor Standardisation (ISO). The ISO is a non-governmental organization based in Geneva whosemembers are national standards institutes from 146 states. While its members are not nationalgovernments, many of the institutes are part of the governmental structure of their countries or aremandated by their government.106 The ISO has focused on voluntary international standards both fora wide range of products (such as standardization of screw threads) and for activities in producinggoods and services (such as quality management).107 Since ISO standards are developed by consensusand are market-driven—where there is a need for MNCs (or others involved in transnationalbusiness) to have a standard then the ISO pursues one—they appear to be used by many MNCsworldwide. To date, the ISO has developed more than 12,000 standards, meaning documentscontaining technical specifications or rules to ensure that products or services across an industry are
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109 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR STANDARDIZATION, ISO 14000 ENVIRONMENTALMANAGEMENT (2d ed. 2001). The standards are periodically revised, including a revisionunderway at the time of this writing. See Tod M. Robinson, Standards Organization Works toFinalize Rules Related to Environmental Management, 27 BNA INT’L ENV. RPTR. 642 (2004). One influential forerunner to the ISO 14000 Series were the principles developed by theCoalition for Environmentally Responsible Economies (CERES), a group of environmentalists,investors, economics, and governments convened by the Social Investment Management Forumin 1989. CERES developed a set of ten principles of corporate responsibility (originally calledthe “Valdez Principles”) which a modest number of MNCs then adopted. For the principles, see<http://www.ceres.org/our_work/principles.htm>. For background, see J. Andy Smith, III, TheCERES Principles: A Voluntary Code for Corporate Environmental Responsibility, 18 YALE J.INT’L L. 307 (1993). A third voluntary program for companies that includes standards forenvironmental management, as well as reporting and auditing, is the European Union’s Eco-Management and Audit System (EMAS), which includes a compliance verification system. See1993 O.J. (L168/1). Some 2,000 companies at present participate in EMAS. For information, see<http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/environment/emas/index_en.htm>.
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in conformance.108The ISO environmental management system standards issued in 1996,109 known as the ISO14000 series, calls upon a company to establish and make publicly available an environmental policysuitable to the company’s size and the environmental impact of its operations. That policy mustinclude compliance with local law and a general commitment to prevent pollution, but the ISO14000 series does not prescribe specific standards that must be met (e.g., permissible toxic releases).Further, the company must adopt procedures to assess and document the environmental impacts ofthe company’s operations (such assessments need not be made public), and employees must betrained in those procedures. Internal monitoring must occur, as well as either internal or externalaudits. Companies may seek certification of conformance with the ISO code,110 and certain external
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certification bodies exist to that end. The ISO 14000 series provides guidance for such audits, suchas methodology and auditor qualifications, and also guidance on labeling goods and services asenvironment-friendly.111 As of December 2003, more than 66,000 ISO 14001 registrations had been completedworldwide.112 Supporters laud the ISO approach as more “systematic, preventive and holistic” thanthe types of command-and-control environmental regulation found in many states, which arguablyis piecemeal, uncoordinated, and focuses on remedies once harm has been done.113 Some observersbelieve that ISO certification can help MNCs penetrate international markets.114 The ISO 14000 series, however, also has its critics. As noted above, the standards do notactually set any specific requirements; they simply call for a “management systems approach” thatmay or may not lead to environmentally-friendly results. While the standards call upon company’s
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to adhere to local laws, those laws may be poor or non-existent or unenforced. The ISO 14000 seriesdoes not call upon company’s to adhere to relevant international instruments, such as treaties onozone depletion, biological diversity, or hazardous wastes, nor non-binding internationalinstruments, such as OECD or UN Environment Program (UNEP) guidelines. Further, while thestandards may prompt greater gathering and dissemination of information within the corporatestructure on adverse environmental effects, there is no requirement of release of such informationto the public, nor a requirement of an external audit, such that there is really no way of monitoringexternally if the company is acting in accordance with the standards nor how it is reacting withadverse environmental effects are uncovered.115 Some critics note that the standards were negotiatedin theory with all stakeholders present (e.g., business, consumer, and environmental representatives),but in reality the better-financed major business entities and developed states dominated thenegotiations, at the expense of smaller enterprises, non-governmental organizations and developingstates.116 At the same time, some developing states may be enthusiastic about the ISO 14000 seriesbecause they are weak enough that developing state companies can readily comply and be regardedas environment-friendly, thus avoiding potential consumer-driven trade sanctions in developed
35
117 Id. at 209.
118 See DURUIGBO, supra note 10, at xv.
119 See, e.g., Human Rights Watch, The Price of Oil: Corporate Responsibility andHuman Rights Violations in Nigeria’s Oil Producing Communities (1999) (alleging complicity ofoil companies in Nigerian human rights violations), available athttp://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/nigeria.
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states.117Codes Focused on Certain Industries. Because certain sectors of the transnational economyhave been susceptible to sharp criticism of their activities, codes have been developed bystakeholders within those sectors tailored to their particular needs. For example, companies in theextractive industries (i.e., oil extraction and mining) have had enormous impacts on the communitiesin which they operate.118 As a result, these companies have been in the spotlight of activist effortsto promote transnational corporate responsibility119 and also exposed to violent acts that seek todisrupt their operations, which have led to aggressive security counter-measures. Over the course of2000, the governments of the United States and the United Kingdom, certain companies in theextractive and energy sectors, and certain nongovernmental organizations met to discuss means forcompanies in those sectors to protect and promote human rights when pursuing corporate security.120In December 2000, the participants announced an initiative—the Voluntary Principles on Securityand Human Rights—to guide such companies toward ensuring respect for human rights and
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121 U.S. State Department Fact Sheet, Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights(Feb. 20, 2001), at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/2931.htm, reprinted in 24 HASTINGS INT’L &COMP. L. REV. 441-49 (2001). For background on the negotiations and a discussion of theprinciples by U.S. government participants, see Bennett Freeman, Maria B. Pica, and ChristopherN. Camponovo, A New Approach to Corporate Responsibility: The Voluntary Principles onSecurity and Human Rights, 24 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L.J. 423 (2001).
122 Id.
fundamental freedoms while at the same time maintaining the safety and security of corporateoperations.121The preamble to the Voluntary Principles states that they are guided by those set forth in theUniversal Declaration of Human Rights and contained in international humanitarian law. TheVoluntary Principles are then divided into three sections: risk assessment, companies’ relations withpublic security, and their relations with private security. The first section notes that assessing riskin the states where a company operates is critical not just for the security of company personnel andassets, but also for the promotion and protection of human rights. The principles call uponcompanies to assess a series of risk factors (e.g., the risk of transferring lethal equipment to publicand private security forces) based on credible information from a broad range of perspectives,including civil society knowledgeable about local conditions. The second section calls uponcompanies to “use their influence” with public security services so as not to (1) use the services ofindividuals credibly implicated in human rights abuses; (2) use force unless “strictly necessary andto an extent proportional to the threat”; and (3) violate the rights of individuals when they areexercising the rights of freedom of association and peaceful assembly, the right to engage incollective bargaining, or other related rights.122 The third section calls for companies to followsimilar principles with respect to private security providers, and further urges them to include such
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123 U.S. Dep’t of State Press Release on Harold Hongju Koh, Assistant Secretary of Statefor Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor; E. Anthony Wayne, Assistant Secretary for Economicand Business Affairs; and David G. Carpenter, Assistant Secretary for Diplomatic Security, PressBriefing on Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights (Dec. 20, 2000), athttp://www.state.gov/www/policy_remarks/2000/001220_koh_hr.html (“For almost a year,officials from eight companies, corporate responsibilities and human rights groups, the StateDepartment and the British Foreign Office, sat side by side in a team effort to develop thesePrinciples. That dialogue is only beginning and will continue into the coming new year.”)
124 For background, see<http://www.bp.com/subsection.do?categoryId=755&contentId=2016171>. The Tangguh projectis located in the Bintuni Bay region of the Bird’s Head area of Papua. According to news reports,the bay is large and pristine bay, with perhaps the largest mangrove forest in the world, and withone of its most varied marine ecosystems. The communities surrounding the bay are small,isolated villages of up to100 families. See Manuela Saragosa, Oil Giant Gets Indonesia Warning,BBC News Service (updated Mar. 12, 2003), athttp://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/2841311.stm.
principles in contracts with such providers (thus allowing termination of the contract if the principlesare not followed).A U.S. government official heralded the Voluntary Principles as significant not just becausethey provide a basis for a global standard on security and human rights in the oil, mining and energysector, but also because they form a foundation for further dialogue between industry in that sectorand civil society.123 Whether the principles will have a significant influence remains to be seen, butthey appear to be taken into account by MNCs in pursuing new extractive projects. For example, inthe 1990’s, enormous natural gas reserves were located off the shore of the Indonesian province ofPapua (formerly known as Irian Jaya), which occupies the western half of the tropical island of NewGuinea. Indonesia decided to develop the gas reserves by removing the gas from its location,processing the gas into liquefied natural gas (LNG), and then transporting it. The U.K./U.S. oil andgas company BP became a principal shareholder in (and the operator of) this project—known as theTangguh LNG Project124—but BP was concerned that it might face considerable criticism for
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125 In particular, BP may have been interested in avoiding the criticisms leveled againstthe U.S.-based company Freeport McMoran, which has been operating the world’s richest goldand copper mine in Papua since the 1970s. Among other things, Freeport McMoran has beencharged with relying excessively on the Indonesian military for security services and engaging inenvironmentally-poor practices. See, e.g., Beanal v. Freeport McMoran, 197 F.3d 161 (5th Cir.1999) (dismissing a case brought against Freeport McMoran for an international environmentaltort under the Alien Tort Claims Act).
126 See BP, Conflict and Security (undated), athttp://www.bp.com/genericarticle.do?categoryId=2011558&contentId=2016988.BP also states that it “supports the principles set forth in the UN Universal Declaration ofHuman Rights and will respect the 2000 International Labour Organisation ‘TripartiteDeclaration of Principles concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy’ and the 2000OECD 'Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises'.” See BP, Ethical Conduct (undated), athttp://www.bp.com/genericarticle.do?categoryId=27&contentId=2000422.
127 See Tangguh Independent Advisory Panel, First Annual Report on Tangguh LNGProject, 5 (Oct. 2002), athttp://www.bp.com/liveassets/bp_internet/globalbp/STAGING/global_assets/downloads/T/Tangguh_Advisory_Panel_first_report_HRIA_1740.pdf.
potential adverse effects of the project in Papua.125Consequently, BP participated in the drafting of the Voluntary Principles and then publiclystated its adherence as a matter of corporate policy to the standards set forth therein.126 Moreover,BP established a Tangguh Independent Advisory Panel to provide external advice to senior BPdecision-makers. Chaired by former U.S. Senator George Mitchell, the panel was charged, amongother things, with advising on the project’s effects on the local community, and on the impact onpolitical, economic, and social conditions in Indonesia generally and in Papua in particular.127 Sinceits inception in 2001, the panel has met with a wide variety of Indonesians, from governmentofficials down to directly affected Papuans, and has provided public reports to BP on its findings andrecommendations. Among other things, the second annual report concluded that BP was committedto abide by the Voluntary Principles and had met that commitment, and offered recommendations
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128 Tangguh Independent Advisory Panel, Second Annual Report on Tangguh LNGProject 3, 18 (Nov. 2003), athttp://www.bp.com/liveassets/bp_internet/globalbp/STAGING/global_assets/downloads/T/TIAP_Second_Annual_Report_updated_23_12_03.pdf.
129 See, e.g., Steven R. Ratner Corporations and Human Rights: A Theory of LegalResponsibility, 111 Yale L.J. 443, 532-533 (2001).
130 SCHRAGE, supra note 28, at xii.
for further use of the Voluntary Principles with respect to certain aspects of the project.128
III. WHETHER THE CODES WILL WITHER
As indicated in the prior section, several voluntary codes of conduct for MNCs have emergedin recent years that seek to ameliorate adverse societal effects of MNC activity, especially in thedeveloping world. Based on the reports and literature surrounding these codes, these codes do appearto be helping to reshape cultural attitudes within at least some MNCs, by raising corporate awarenessof potentially adverse MNC activity in the developing world and creating benchmarks by whichexternal groups may measure MNC behavior.129 One recent study of codes relating to internationallabor rights focused on case studies of four different industries across four different geographicregions and concluded, among other things, that such codes “have the potential to generate directimprovements in the conditions of workers and communities in the global supply chains of majorindustries.”130 Code enthusiasts hope that MNCs will increasingly see the benefits of upholding keysocietal values and thereby enrich the environment in which they operate. Such optimism regardingthe codes may be warranted; the “arc” of their use by MNCs is, on its face, fairly impressive giventhe minimal MNC attention given to such issues thirty years ago. 
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131 See, e.g., John Christopher Anderson, Respecting Human Rights: MultinationalCorporations Strike Out, 2 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 463, 489 (2000); Ratner, supra note 129, at532.
132 See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 131, at 486 (discussing successes at Levi Strauss,Mattel, and Nike).
133 See, e.g., William H. Meyer & Boyka Stefanova, Human Rights, the UN GlobalCompact, and Global Governance, 34 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 501, 503 (2001) (recountingconflicting empirical studies regarding MNC concern for civil-political rights and socioeconomicwelfare in developing states); SETHI, supra note 13, at 15-38 (providing a study of news reportsregarding adverse societal effects of MNC activities in developing states). A non-governmentalorganization called the Business & Human Rights Resource Centre—a collaborative partnershipbetween Amnesty International sections and certain academic institutions—maintains anextensive internet site with links to reports regarding adverse MNC activity. Seehttp://www.business-humanrights.org/Home 
At the same time, such codes have their critics, and the critics have been articulate andaggressive in voicing their concerns. In particular, the voluntary nature of the codes leads manyobservers to see the codes as largely or potentially MNC public relations ploys.131 On this account,MNCs may purport to follow such codes, but do so only with varying degrees of seriousness.Notwithstanding anecdotal success stories,132 for the critics there remain too many instances ofadverse social effects of MNC activity133 to conclude that voluntary codes in their present form aloneare the solution. As Janelle Diller of the International Labour Organization notes
Even if transnational private initiative can present a sustainable “high road” for businessconduct amidst the complexities of global transactions over time, claims by enterprises andother actors concerning social improvements achieved through private initiatives are noteasily categorized, evaluated or compared. Some controversy may thus be inevitable. Theseinitiatives operate across diverse economic, political and legal contexts, without standard
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134 Diller, supra note 34, at 101.
135 See SCHRAGE, supra note 28, at 165.
136 See Mark Baker, Private Codes of Corporate Conduct: Should the Fox Guard theHenhouse, 24 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 399 (1992-1993).
137 See, e.g., DURUIGBO, supra note 10, at 156 (“To ensure that harmful business activitiesare eliminated, limited or punished, a strong regulatory and enforcement network underinternational law is called for.”)
138 See UN Convention Against Corruption, GA Res. 58/4, annex (Oct. 31, 2003),available at http://untreaty.un.org/English/notpubl/Corruption_E.pdf; OECD Convention onCombating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions, Dec. 17,1997, OECD Doc. DAFFE/IME/BR(97)20, 37 I.L.M. 1 (1998), available at
reference points or generally accepted methods of development, implementation orassessment. A number of implications therefore arise from limitations inherent I the waysuch initiatives are developed, implemented and ultimately assessed.134
Over time, if the codes remain in nature as they presently are, while demands for social andenvironmental justice increase, the codes may lose much of the their legitimacy.135 Consumers,shareholders, and other stakeholders may not feel that adoption of a code has any significance; thatthe code is disingenuous. At best, current criticisms may persist; at worst, if demands for greatercorporate responsibility increase, the notion of allowing the “fox” to guard the “hen-house” may fallinto severe disrepute, such that the codes whither in meaning, if not in form.136The unease with voluntary codes of conduct has led to calls for transforming the codes intobinding law, both at the international and national level.137 Some treaties already exist designed toreign in corporate misconduct: ranging from ILO treaties and regulations (some dating to the earlytwentieth century) to recent initiatives concerning corporate bribery of officials138 and corporate
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http://www.oecd.org; OAS Inter-American Convention Against Corruption, Mar. 29, 1996, OASDoc. B-58, 35 I.L.M. 724 (1996), available at http://www.oas.org; Council of Europe CriminalLaw Convention on Corruption, Jan. 27, 1999, ETS No. 173, 38 I.L.M. 505 (1999); Organizationof African Unity Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption, July 11, 2003, availableat http://www.africa-union.org.
139 Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, May 21, 2003, 42 I.L.M. 518 (2003),available at <http://www.who.int/tobacco>. The FCTC was adopted by WHA Res. 56.1 (May21, 2003).
140 Ratner, supra note 129, at 538-40.
141 See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 131, at 500-504 (calling for enactment in the UnitedStates of a federal “Foreign Human Rights Abuse Act” as well as revocation of corporatecharters by the several states of the United States when MNCs act improperly). In 1989-91,Congress considered but did not adopt legislation that would formulate a code of conduct forU.S. corporations doing business in the Soviet Union and in China. See Frey, supra note 48, at170-71.
142 See, e.g., Weissbrodt & Kruger, supra note 73, at 919-21.
exports of tobacco.139 One can imagine aggressively pursuing the transformation of the existingvoluntary codes into treaty law, either on a broad scale or in selected areas, with appropriateenforcement or monitoring mechanisms.140 One can also imagine adopting new national “commandand control” legislation codifying and developing such norms,141 and further can imagine urginginternational and national courts to use the codes as though they expressed rules of law.142 If overtime this is the fate of voluntary corporate codes, then as they wither away, the codes will be viewedas simply stepping stones in the crystallization of law. There are, however, reasons to doubt that such a movement toward binding law will succeed,at least in the near term. Many of the binding treaties on issues addressing corporate conduct havesecured low rates of ratification, such as several of the ILO treaties. There remain considerabledifferences of views among blocs of states—and not just between North and the South—regarding
43the development of such conventions, which suggests that successes in crafting new agreements willbe difficult. National legislation remains a possibility, but developed states are wary of adoptingconstraints on their MNCs that place them at a competitive disadvantage. Unless the enactment ofnational laws can be coordinated among blocs of states, the development of such laws will likelyprove problematic. Perhaps most importantly, MNCs—who remain powerful actors to whomgovernments pay heed will resist such transformation into binding law. Indeed, the reason voluntarycodes were adopted to begin with was because of the political obstacles and legal complications inregulating non-state entities who operate across borders, and because of a desire to preserve somelevel of flexibility in the regulation of such actors as well as promote true “internalization” of valuesby MNCs. Those same factors will continue to make direct regulation of MNC activity problematic.This essay suggests that far greater attention should be given, at least in the near term, to amiddle way, one that falls between simple reliance on voluntary codes as they are currentlystructured and, alternatively, pursuing their transformation into binding law. The middle way wouldseek to bring governments more actively back into the process of promoting good corporate conduct,but would do so by both reinforcing the value and benefits of the voluntary codes to MNCs andholding MNCs to the codes to which they have subscribed. In other words, while these codes mayreflect an aspect of the decline of the nation-state, a fertile area for buttressing the codes—forensuring their survival and effectiveness—may well lie in more creative use of the power of nation-states. 
IV. TAKING THE CODES SERIOUSLY
44Rather than view “command-and-control” laws as the next best step in addressing MNCconduct, policy-makers should consider a range of governmental initiatives that reinforce the valueand benefits of the voluntary codes to MNCs (in other words, creating “carrots”), while at the sametime holding MNCs to the codes to which they have subscribed (creating “sticks”). At the heart ofthis approach is the notion that MNCs are not required to adopt a particular code; the code remainsa voluntary set of normative constraints that the MNC may embrace or not as it wishes. However,governments can pursue legislative and administrative initiatives that make adoption of a code moreattractive to MNCs, while at the same time pursuing initiatives that increase the likelihood that theMNC will adhere to the code it has voluntarily adopted. To be effective, government policy shouldbalance the use of “carrots” and “sticks.” If only carrots are created, more MNCs may be pulled intothe adoption of corporate codes, but with spotty adherence. If only sticks are created, MNCs mayview the adoption of codes as undesirable burdens.Among the “carrots” that governments might pursue that reinforce the value and benefits ofthe voluntary codes to MNCs are the following.Getting stakeholders together. Governments should pay more attention to the possibility oflending their weight to convening groups of stakeholders in a particular problem area, for thepurpose of having them develop a voluntary code deemed appropriate by all. As seen in discussionabove of the Voluntary Principles for extractive industries, governments can have a catalytic effectin bringing diverse groups together and pressing them to negotiate an appropriate code. MNCs in aparticular industry or region may find such government participation useful if they anticipaterecurrent attacks by civil society groups on their activities, and if government involvement can help
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143 See SCHRAGE, supra note 28, at 178-79. 
bring such groups to the table in a manner that the MNCs see as constructive.143 Civil society groupsmay also welcome such government involvement, since governments, as regulators, have influentialrelationships with MNCs and can press MNCs to participate in the development of a meaningfulcode. Setting a code for the codes. One of the principal attractions for MNCs to voluntary codesis that such codes provide considerable flexibility for the MNC in developing its own internal codeof conduct; different types of codes can be developed for different industries and MNCs withinindustries, tailored to their particular needs and capabilities. While such flexibility can and shouldbe maintained, it should also be possible to develop better standards for what an internal MNC codeshould look like (a “code for codes”), and governments—again acting as a facilitator of stakeholderinterests—may be in the best position to do so. A minimalist code for codes might look somethinglike the UN Global Compact—simply calling for MNCs to adhere to codes that address certain coreissues, such as labor, human rights, environmental harm, and corruption, or it might look like theOECD Guidelines—elaborating on the standards that any MNC code should include (e.g., acommitment to abide by national laws in states where the MNC operates). But a minimalist code forcodes might contain other features common to all existing internal MNC codes, such as calling forMNCs, if they subscribe to a code, to publicly adopt it in writing and to train employees in the code.A more ambitious code for codes could address further procedural aspects that any MNC codeshould include, such as providing employees with a mechanism (e.g., a hotline or helpline) to surfaceconcerns about corporate compliance with the MNC code. Even more ambitious still would be acode for codes that clarified the different means by which an MNC could achieve transparency
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144 For a list of criteria and suggested framework for an auditing procedure, see SETHI,supra note 13, at 205-06, 210-14.
145 One model the governments might build upon is that set by Social AccountabilityInternational (SAI), a U.S.-based, nonprofit organization. SAI’s mission is to develop, implementand oversee voluntary and verifiable social accountability standards. SAI has adopted its own setof social accountability standards, known as SA-8000 (which mimic the approach taken by theISO to setting standards), which focus in part on “social auditing.” For information, seehttp://www.sa-intl.org/index.htm.
146 See, e.g., SCHRAGE, supra note 28, at 177 (“The United States should use its prestigeand credibility to serve as an honest broker to endorse or ‘qualify’ serious [private voluntaryinitiatives] that address labor standards violations.”)
regarding its adherence to the code, the means by which such adherence might be monitored,verified, audited, or certified, both internally and externally, and standards for what would constitutetrue independent scrutiny by qualified persons.144 Indeed, the code for codes might indicate different“tiers” of scrutiny, from least rigorous to most rigorous, such that MNCs who adopt a code couldindicate where they fall on a spectrum of scrutiny, thus perhaps inducing higher levels ofoversight.145 The overall purpose of such a code for codes would not be to require MNCs to adopt anyparticular code but, rather, to provide a “quality control” template (or the “standard referencepoints”) that would reduce the likelihood of sham MNC codes. If such a template helped guideshareholders, consumers, and others in determining whether a code adopted by an MNC was alegitimate effort to achieve good corporate conduct, then MNCs may find adoption to stronger andmore effective codes in their interest. Indeed, a logical next step might be for governments to endorseparticular MNC codes as meeting the requirements of the code for codes, thus helping to differentiatecodes that fall short.146 Leniency from regulators. Governments are regulators of MNCs in various ways, ranging
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147 In the United States, “Congress has the authority to enforce its laws beyond theterritorial boundaries of the United States.” EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248(1991). However, U.S. courts presume that Congress has not exercised this power, unlessCongress manifests an intent to reach acts performed outside U.S. territory. Thus, the normalpresumption by U.S. courts is that U.S. statutes apply only to acts performed within U.S.territory. See Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 188 (1993) (holding that a U.S.immigration statute does not apply extraterritorially); Smith v. United States, 507 U.S. 197, 209(1993) (holding that the Federal Tort Claims Act does not apply extraterritorially). 
148 See, e.g., Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (1977), asamended (expressly focusing on bribery occurring outside the United States); ____ U.S.C.§_____ (prohibiting the import of goods made with convict labor). 
149 See, e.g., Peter Swire, Safe Harbors and a Proposal to Improve the CommunityReinvestment Act, 79 VA. L. REV. 349 (1993); Note, “Safe Harbor” As Tax Reform: TaxpayerElection of Lease Treatment, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1648 (1982).
from securities disclosure laws to occupational safety laws to environmental protection laws, andso on. In many countries, such regulation of MNCs operates only territorially; governments do notgenerally seek to regulate extraterritorially unless MNC actions abroad have some effect within thegovernment’s territory.147 In some instances, however, governments do regulate the conduct ofMNCs abroad,148 and in any event regulators may be granted considerable discretion wheninterpreting their mandate to regulate. As such, governments should consider whether by statute,regulation, or administrative rule more can be done to use voluntary codes as a device for favorabletreatment to an MNC. To the extent that the regulator uses adherence to a voluntary code as a meansfor according an MNC favorable treatment, then the MNC will view adherence to the code as moreattractive.One relevant concept in this regard is the idea of “safe harbors.”149 Where there is a generalstandard to which an MNC is exposed under national law, and then a more specific rule that tells anMNC that it has met the standard, then that more specific rule operates as a “safe harbor”; an MNC
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150 See Swire, supra note 149, at 369-78.
151 Criminal statutes also often are not extraterritorial in nature, although in the UnitedStates the presumption against extraterritoriality appears somewhat weaker for federal criminalstatutes as a class. See United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 98 (1922) (finding that thepresumption did not apply to “criminal statutes which are, as a class, not logically dependent ontheir locality for the Government’s jurisdiction, but are enacted because of the right of theGovernment to defend itself against obstruction, or fraud wherever perpetrated, especially if
can rely on following the rule as a means for satisfying the standard. Where government regulatorshave the power to hold MNCs to certain standards regarding their conduct abroad, then byestablishing adherence to a voluntary code as a means for meeting that standard provides the MNCwith a safe harbor, and concomitantly augments the value of having and adhering to such a code.Certain factors that in general make a safe harbor more attractive150 may be present with
respect to voluntary codes for MNCs, depending on the national laws to which the safe harborapplies. If a national legal system is imposing a relatively vague standard on MNC activity abroad,the MNC may find it difficult to ensure full compliance with the standard if there are numerousMNC transactions at issue and if there is great uncertainty regarding how to comply with thestandard. Further, the MNC may face high costs if it were to pre-clear its activities with regulatorsand high costs if its conduct is found non-conforming. In such situations, adoption of an internalMNC code that meets conditions acceptable to the regulator may be very attractive to the MNC asa safe harbor. Obviously, the government may wish to consider setting certain conditions regardingwhat codes would be regarded as acceptable, as discussed in the prior sub-section.
Leniency in criminal prosecution. The same concept may be employed with respect toleniency in criminal prosecution, assuming that there are national criminal laws regulating MNCconduct abroad.151 For example, in November 1991, the U.S. Sentencing Commission issued
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committed by its own nationals, officers or agents.”).
152 See U.S. Federal Sentencing Guidelines §8C2.5(f) (2002), available athttp://www.ussc.gov/2002guid/CHAP8.htm.
153 Id., §8A1.2, commentary at K(1).
154 Elliot J. Schrage, Judging Corporate Accountability in the Global Economy, 42COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 153, 169-73 (2003).
155 In the United States, numerous suits have been filed against MNCs under Alien TortClaims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000), although to date with limited success. See, e.g., Beanal v.Freeport-McMoran, Inc., 197 F.3d 161 (5th Cir. 1999) (finding that the environmentalagreements upon which the claim was pled did not provide discernable standards for identifyinginternational environmental torts); see also Torture Victim Protection Act, 28 U.S.C. §1350 note(2000) (which provides a civil remedy to persons who suffer torture or extrajudicial killing by, orunder authority of, a foreign government).
Guidelines for Organizations,152 which are used by U.S. Attorneys in weighing whether to charge theorganization and used by judges in sentencing an organization. For organizations that evince “aneffective program to prevent and detect violations of law,” the guidelines provide for a lesserpunishment even if a violation transpires. Such a program must include the organization establishing“compliance standards and procedures to be followed by its employees and other agents that arereasonably capable of reducing the prospect of criminal conduct.”153 Governments should considerwhether, for criminal statutes relating to MNC activity abroad, the MNC’s voluntary adoption of acorporate code merits leniency in charging and sentencing. Again, by doing so, governments wouldserve to buttress the value and benefit to an MNC in adopting a meaningful code.
Leniency with respect to civil claims. Governments could also consider a similar approachwith respect to civil suits against MNCs for misconduct abroad.154 To the extent that a government’snational law allows civil suits for such conduct,155 then the government might encourage courts toview an MNC’s adoption of a voluntary code as a basis for certain evidentiary presumptions or for
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156 See Schrage, supra note 154, at172. Interventions by governments in cases ad hocwould allow for individualized assessments of the voluntary code adopted by the MNC, but alsorisks politicizing the view taken by a government, with the government’s attitude potentiallyturning more on the country where the alleged abuse occurred or the government’s relationshipwith the defending MNC, and less on the MNC’s adherence to a code and the quality of thatcode. For example, the U.S. government’s experience in appearing ad hoc before U.S. courts toaddress whether foreign governments should be immune from suit proved to be one where theU.S. government did not engage in consistent behavior and ultimately one that the U.S.government did not welcome, thus leading to the creation of an overall standard for U.S. courtsto follow in the form of the 1976 Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1332,1391(f), 1441 (d), 1602–1611 (2000).
157 See John Yarney, Shell Rejects Nigerian Senate Order to Pay Compensation forEnvironmental Damage, 27 INT’L ENV. REP. 708 (2004).
mitigation of damages. Such encouragement might take the form of a statute, regulation, or overallstatement of policy, or might take the form of friend-of-the-court interventions by the governmentin particular civil suits as claims arise.156
For instance, while the Nigerian Senate recently adopted a resolution ordering ShellPetroleum Development Company of Nigeria to pay $1.5 billion as compensation for environmentaldegradation, health problems, and loss of livelihood,157 an alternative—and likely more constructive—approach to a civil compensation scheme would seek to promote good MNC behavior in advanceof harm occurring, by developing a civil penalty scheme in which voluntary codes feature as apotential means of limiting MNC liability. Again, if carefully constructed, such leniency wouldencourage MNCs to adhere to the voluntary code, thereby decreasing the likelihood that harm willoccur.
Government procurement and financing. Governments should consider including in theirregulations and policies on procurement of goods and services a role for MNC adherence tovoluntary codes. For example, the U.S. Federal Acquisition Regulations relating to suspension or
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158 Federal Acquisition Regulations, FAR Reg. 9.401-1(a)(1) (2001). available athttp://farsite.hill.af.mil/VFFARa.HTM.
159 See, e.g., Dep’t of Defense Federal Acquisition Regulations, DFAR Reg. 203.7000(1998) (setting forth certain principles for standards of conduct and internal control systems),available at http://farsite.hill.af.mil/vfdfarspdf.htm.
160 The 2002 “Monterrey Consensus” urged financial institutions to foster innovativedevelopmental financing approaches as a means of promoting good corporate citizenship. Reportof the International Conference on Financing for Development, Monterrey, Mexico, 18-22 March2002, UN Doc. A/CONF.198/11, para. 23 (2002), available athttp://www.un.org/esa/ffd/0302finalMonterreyConsensus.pdf. The Monterrey Conference wasthe first U.N.-hosted conference to address key financial and development issues, and wasattended by heads of state, government ministers, leaders from the private sector and civilsociety, and senior officials of all the major inter-governmental financial, trade, economic, andmonetary organizations.
debarment of a government contractor for irresponsible behavior recognize as a mitigating factor“[w]hether the contractor had effective standards of conduct and internal control systems in placeat the time of the activity which constitutes cause for debarment or had adopted such proceduresprior to any Government investigation of the activity cited as a cause for debarment.”158 IndividualU.S. government agencies then supplement the FAR to set forth their expectations regarding ethicsand conduct of those from whom they procure goods and services.159 It would be a natural extensionof such requirements for government agencies engaged in commercial relations with MNCs torequire that the MNC adopt a voluntary code of a type determined by the government to beappropriate and effective. Similarly, government decision-making with respect to financing ofdevelopment projects—whether financed directly by governments or through international financialinstitutions—might look for ways to make adoption of and adherence to a voluntary code a conditionof such financing.160
Such “carrots” would be helpful in pulling MNCs into codes, but governments should also
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161 See Parkinson, supra note 30, at 59; see also Diller, supra note 34, at 119 (“Notinfrequently, a code launched with much publicity in an industrialized country is unknown,unavailable or untranslated at producing facilities . . .”).
consider steps that might be taken to ensure that the codes adopted by MNCs are effective inconditioning MNC behavior. Among the “sticks” that governments might pursue to make it morelikely that the MNC will adhere to the code it has voluntarily adopted are the following.
Promoting transparency. Through government laws, regulations, or administrative rules,governments might require that, when MNCs adopt an internal code of conduct, they divulgepublicly information about what the code says, who is trained in the code and how, and informationon whether and how the code is monitored and audited. Such disclosure of information might berequired as part of laws that allow corporations to form or securities laws that require corporationsto divulge information pertinent to shareholder decision-making. While such disclosure may beburdensome to an MNC, it also serves the objective of accountability of the MNCs to itsshareholders, and makes “more effective the market mechanisms that steer companies towardsresponsible conduct . . . .”161
Promoting truth-in-advertising. To the extent that MNCs are using their adherence tovoluntary codes as a means of assuaging public concerns about their activities abroad, then MNCsshould be prepared to have those claims scrutinized as a matter of consumer protection laws. Suchscrutiny could take the form of periodic investigations by government consumer protection offices.Additionally, governments might consider opening the court-room doors to civil claims wherebyprivate attorneys-general pursue judicial review of MNC claims. For example, when NikeCorporation allegedly made false statements of fact about its labor practices and about working
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162 Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 27 Cal.4th 939, 946 (2002) (“Because the messages in questionwere directed by a commercial speaker to a commercial audience, and because they maderepresentations of fact about the speaker’s own business operations for the purpose of promotingsales of its products, we conclude that these messages are commercial speech for purposes ofapplying state laws barring false and misleading commercial messages.”)
163 Non-governmental entities are used to certify vessel compliance with variousregulations promulgated under the Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, Nov.2, 1973, 12 I.L.M. 1319, 1340 U.N.T.S. 184, and its 1978 protocol, 17 I.L.M. 546, 1341U.N.T.S. 3.
164 For example, IMO regulations enacted in 2002 as amendments to chapter V andchapter XI (now renumbered as chapter XI–1) of the International Convention for the Safety ofLife at Sea (SOLAS) International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, Nov. 1, 1974, 32UST 47, 1184 UNTS 276, provides that states shall disfavor entry of vessels to ports where thevessels have not obtained an “International Ship Security Certificate” issued by authorized non-governmental shipping societies. See IMO Doc. SOLAS/CONF.5/32, annex (Dec. 12, 2002)(containing Resolution 1 of the December 2002 conference, which contains in its annex theamendments), at <http://www.dcmnr.gov.ie/files/marsecXI-2.pdf>.
conditions in factories that made its products, the Supreme Court of California found that suchstatements could violate California statutes on false advertising and unfair competition laws, and thatsuch statements were not protected free speech.162
Promoting oversight processes. As has been previously noted, existing codes containingvarious levels of oversight, which may consist of internal or external monitoring, verification, audits,or certifications. While requiring MNCs to adopt a particular form of oversight would likely runafoul of the inherent flexibility of the code approach, governments might nevertheless endorse as apart of the code on codes discussed above criteria for desirable oversight techniques. Moreover,governments through national laws, regulations, or administrative rules could license personsperforming such functions, thereby ensuring higher quality auditors and certifiers. As governmentsgain increasing experience with use of non-governmental monitors on matters such as maritimesafety163 and port security,164 governments should move toward developing appropriate normative
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structures for ensuring the integrity of such monitors, including those used by MNCs to validateadherence to voluntary codes.
V. CONCLUSION
A U.S. government representative recently noted that the
promise of rich governments to give 0.7 percent of their gross domestic product to poorercountries remains not only a promise, it is a relic, its actual dollars now dwarfed bysignificantly larger sums of private capital flows. Far-flung colonial empires have beenreplaced by corporations, the borderless empires of which are more suited to the nimbleresponses in a world that demands them.165
This rise of MNCs as globally dominant economic forces has been characterized by an extensivemovement of capital, goods and services across borders, which gives MNCs enormous influence onthe working conditions of their laborers in developing countries and on the environmental effectsof their operations without any countervailing power exercised by nation-states. A central questionis whether globalization of the markets that has occurred over the past thirty years is sustainablewithout a better normative structure—whether such MNC dominance will increasingly trigger
55backlashes by laborers, consumers, and other stakeholders because the benefits of MNC activity aredistributed too unequally. While it is true that capitalism, at its core, entails freedom to pursueeconomic self-interest, it is equally true that capitalism in developed states only survived thechallenge of socialist and communist movements by developing a distributive system of socialbenefits that was perceived as equitable, fair, and just. 
Existing voluntary codes may preclude such backlashes, but they may also be seen asinadequate, leading to demands for greater government regulation MNCs. In the long-term, MNCsmay be best served by finding ways to make voluntary codes more meaningful and effective. In thatregard, this essay suggests that greater attention should be given to the role of governments inaugmenting such codes, and to that end suggests several “carrots” and “sticks” that governmentsmight deploy. Such devices may prove politically difficult or impossible for some governments, butto the extent they can be achieved, they may help promote a synergy between government regulationand MNC self-regulation, one that will help ease the frictions associated with the decline of thenation-state so presciently observed by Oscar Schachter.
